Several news sources this week covered the formal disintegration of Sprint’s partnership with the cable companies, which had been marketed under the brand name Pivot. This news was a long time coming, and neither Sprint nor the cable companies had been investing in the service for some time.
In fact, it seemed as if none of the companies really ever invested anything significant in the venture beyond the initial outlay to set up the entity which ran it. Cable company call center representatives were not apparently paid commission on Pivot sales and thus had very little incentive to sell the service when they had plenty of other options to pursue with their customers. It also never really made it out of the initial test markets.
There clearly are people who want to watch TV on their handsets, and there are even people (myself included) who would like to be able to set their DVRs from their cellphones. But that doesn’t mean they want a service which revolves around those features. And they especially don’t want a service which feels like it is tied down to a particular feature set and a secondary relationship which they may or may not want to keep over the long term.
This is the same problem which doomed Mobile ESPN - people want ESPN content on their phones (the Sports Center audience numbers don’t lie, and they pretty much all have cellphones), but they first and foremost want great phone service, good prices, attractive devices, good customer service and so on. Then they want to be able to layer that other stuff on top, and add and remove it as necessary over time, whether for financial reasons or just because something better has come along.
Even though mobile services tied into quad plays from telcos have been more successful, they haven’t been hugely so, and it comes down to the same reason. People want to make an individual decision about mobile phones that is decoupled from the other decisions they make about communications and media services they subscribe to. The two-year contracts they’re locked into are quite enough restriction for most people, and they don’t want any more.
It appears the cable companies realize that, and perhaps always have. Although the logic of the partnership was sound at a high level - the cable companies have everything except wireless, and Sprint had only wireless, in a world which appears to be moving towards bundles - but that logic breaks down once you get into the details. People are buying bundles, but they’re buying bundles of home services and not typically bundles including mobile.
The cable companies, though, still feel they need a play in wireless, if not because of the bundling trend, then for two other reasons: other companies are offering mobile TV services, which may erode their share at the margins, and because they are experiencing the same slow-down in their core business that is driving the telcos in their bid for TV- and mobile-driven growth. They need wireless as a source of growth, even if not a source of higher ARPU from each individual customer.
As such, it appears they’re making some moves to get back into the wireless market via a more direct route. Having acquired AWS spectrum, some of them also acquired 700MHz spectrum in the recent auction.
There have been unofficial rumors that the cable companies may be planning to do a deal with Google, Sprint and Clearwire to build a national WiMAX network. And Comcast has apparently hired the former CTO of Telefonica O2 Europe to investigate options for the company’s wireless strategy.
There’s no telling at this point whether they will be successful this time around - joint ventures are notoriously bad at working out. But with the cable companies more in control of their own destinies they probably have a better chance with this than they did with Pivot.
The standard story told in the US media, by certain politicians and by consumer rights groups is that the US lags the rest of the world in broadband, with studies often placing the US well down the international rankings. This week there was a report from the INSEAD / the World Economic Forum which contradicted somewhat those glum findings and accords more closely with my own views on this topic.
The problem with many of these reports is that they focus on price and availability of high speeds without investigating the negative effects associated with heavy government intervention in the market. As an example, Japan is often cited as the beacon of international broadband, often closely followed by Korea, but in both of these countries the government has intervened in a heavy-handed fashion to achieve the results seen today. European countries often also score highly, often because of the competition introduced via local loop unbundling regulations - a less intrusive form of intervention than in Japan and Korea but nonetheless a much more aggressive form of regulation than that which applies in the US.
Another flaw is that it is assumed that faster speeds are always a good thing, and that diminishing returns never set in. The fact is that, beyond a certain point (currently around 10Mbit/s or so) extra bandwidth is just that - extra. There is almost no application in existence today which requires more than 20Mbit/s when in peak use, and so 100Mbit/s is a senseless benchmark. Getting more of the population to 5, then 10 and ultimately 20Mbit/s is a reasonable goal, but beating up on the US for the paucity of 100Mbit/s connections is an exercise in futility that could lead to bad investment decisions. Verizon’s FiOS infrastructure is certainly capable of delivering that kind of bandwidth, although AT&T’s U-Verse probably isn’t under the present architecture. But the point is that it doesn’t matter.
Another thing that’s rarely examined is the pricing side of the equation. Providers in Korea in particular have a very spotty financial history due to the suicidal price wars they’ve engaged in. But that competition has been spurred by the fact that they - like the US - have inter-modal competition between various infrastructures, not just regulation-based service-level competition on a common infrastructure. The latter gets quick results in terms of number of providers and price competition but it rarely foments real innovation because the underlying wholesale services everyone is using are the same. With a shift from bitstream to local loop unbundling products that changes somewhat, but competing infrastructures - especially ones built on fiber - are much more likely to provide real differentiation.
Hence the massive speed and price competition that’s been triggered in the US in areas where fiber has been rolled out by either AT&T or Verizon. In time this will reach more and more of the population and provide a further boost to both the speed and price sides of the equation.
The biggest issue for me is that these reports rely a lot on the question of timing. Where the US is today, other countries either were yesterday or will be tomorrow. We’re all heading down pretty much the same path, just at different speeds. The impatience that often accompanies the criticisms of US broadband deployments is misguided too. It usually leans on an argument about competitiveness and the ways in which broadband can transform the way we work by providing more opportunities for home working / teleworking and so on. But guess what? The measly 5Mbit/s so derided in these studies is just fine for most homeworkers and is available to almost everyone. The biggest barrier to adoption of home working is the cultural change involved, not the technology. Many companies and individual managers are still uncomfortable with the idea and suspect that a home worker is a less productive worker. That attitude needs to change more than we need more government intervention or sackcloth and ashes about the parlous state of the US broadband market, and it’s great that we finally have a study that seems to get that.
